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**Questions and Options for the Emerging Reform of the  
Hungarian Security and Defence Regulation**

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**QUESTIONS AND OPTIONS FOR THE EMERGING REFORM OF THE  
HUNGARIAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE REGULATION**

**1. Introduction**

Both the Ninth Amendment of the Fundamental Law (hereinafter: A9FL), which was adopted on 15 December 2020 with provisions claiming political attention and affecting the defence and security functions of the state substantially, and Act XCIII of 2021 on the Coordination of Defence and Security Activities adopted on 15 June 2021 (hereinafter: Coordination Act) consistently forecast a reform of the regulations governing defence and security, and confirm these in their justifications. The joint entry into force date of the A9FL and the Coordination Law was set for 1 July 2023 to allow sufficient time to complete additional regulatory tasks and prepare for implementation, reflecting the unity of modernisation, one of the features of the reform. However, due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict turning into a war, the tenth amendment to the Fundamental Law brought forward the entry into force to 1 November 2022. Embarking on such a reform, however, seen in conjunction with moderate communication, necessarily raises a number of professional questions - even if political overtones are categorically separated - and at the same time opens up various possibilities for the regulatory and institutional framework for guaranteeing security in Hungary in the 21st century. As the author of these lines, I welcome the onset of such a process given that I stressed the urgency of reform in my previous research and proposals<sup>2</sup>. In this context, however, it is also important to identify some questions and options that can help this country implement real reform once it walks down the road that the A9FL and the Coordination Act may open up, provided that our interpretation of the reform goes beyond full or partial upgrading of existing legislation and introduces a new regulatory and organizational era leading to functional and operational changes.

Technological, social and economic changes of the first two decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century along with both the directly or indirectly related changes and experiences in security clearly call for a new era. Firstly, the transformation of cyberspace along with the information environment propelled to a new level the combination of legitimate and illegitimate military and non-military options responding to classic security threats, particularly strategic ambitions

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<sup>2</sup> See: Ádám Farkas: *Tévelygések fogságában? Tanulmányok az állam fegyveres védelmének egyes jogtani és államtani kérdéseiről, különös tekintettel Magyarországon katonai védelmére.* [In the grip of delusions? Studies of certain aspects of the armed protection of a state, particularly the military protection of Hungary, from the perspective of law and political science.] Magyar Katonai és Hadijogi Társaság, Budapest, 2016.; Ádám Farkas: *Szemléletváltást védelmi aspektusban!* [Change the mindset of defence!] In: Pázmány Law Working Papers 2015/18.; Ádám Farkas: *Gondolatok az állam fegyveres védelmének lehetséges szabályozásfejlesztési irányairól.* [Thoughts on the potential courses of developing legislation on the armed defence of the state.] In: *Honvédségi Szemle* 2018/4. pp. 32-20.; Ádám Farkas: *Gondolatok az állam fegyveres védelmének lehetséges intézményfejlesztési irányairól.* [Thoughts on the potential courses of developing the institutions of the armed defence of the state.] In: *Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle* 2017/1–2. pp. 124-103.; Ádám Farkas: *Az állam fegyveres védelmének alapvonalai.* [The baselines of the armed defence of the state.] Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat, Budapest, 2019.; Ádám Farkas: *A kortárs technológia-fejlődés és innováció viszonya a honvédelmi szabályozással.* [The relationship between contemporary technological development and innovation and defence legislation.] In: MTA Law Working Papers 2021/4.; Ádám Farkas: *A védelem és biztonság-szavatolás szabályozásának alapkérdései Magyarországon* [Fundamental issues of security and safety regulation in Hungary], Magyar Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Társaság, Budapest, 2022.

infringing upon sovereignty,<sup>3</sup> which, on its own, goes beyond most of our earlier defence and security mechanisms and especially our regulatory approach. Secondly, one must also take into account the technical foundations of the complex security experiences of the past decades, which are likely to start a major upswing, that is to say innovations that impress us as revolutionary are expected to have a multiplier effect and will further shape the range of challenges ahead.<sup>4</sup> Thirdly, in addition to managing these changes, which will have a major impact on our security and on safeguarding it, we must pay close attention to ecological changes, which are driven by industrialization and the overpopulation of the planet and will propel security challenges and threats of human origin as well.

In a defence and security reform, it is therefore necessary to take account of all of these impacts in a way that regulation does not remain a self-contained narrative. Instead it should offer a framework for delimiting the operation of defence and security capabilities, and a solid basis and guidelines for strengthening the defence and security approach and for developing and upgrading our security awareness. Seeking to support the feasibility of such a reform in principle, this paper intends to identify some of the questions around the prelude to the reform and to outline the options for deeper, epoch-changing innovation.

## 2. Questions around the prelude to the defence and security reform

Regarding the changes envisaged in A9FL and the Coordination Act, we consider it essential to identify the following questions and to subject them to future research and real professional discourse for clarification:

- 1) How to identify the intended depth and horizontal scope of the change process in terms of regulation?
- 2) From which stage of the reform will professional/scientific and social dialogue be developed and integrated into the change process, and what will be the framework for doing so according to the plans?
- 3) Does the legislator seek to rethink the complete system of operating state and public defence and security instead of giving it a tune-up through a series of regulatory steps adjusting the existing/traditional conceptual framework and mindset (including socio-technical systems/operations research<sup>5</sup>), and, if so, what methods does the legislator intend to use?

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<sup>3</sup> In this respect, see: Amaël Cattaruzza: A digitális adatok geopolitikája. [The geopolitics of digital data.] Pallas Athéné Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2020.; Haim Assa: Cyberspace and its effect on cultural-political and social processes. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 2011.; Jessikka Aro: Putyin trolljai. [Putin's Trolls.] Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, 2021.; Tibor Kiss – Katalin Parti – Gergő Prazsák: Cyberdeviancia. [Cyber Deviance.] Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2019.; Mary Aiken: Cybercsapda. Hogyan változtatja meg az online tér az emberi viselkedést? [Cyber trap. How does online space change human behaviour?] Harmat Kiadó, Budapest, 2020.; William Nester: Putyin virtuális háborúja. [Putin's virtual war.] Hajja Book Kft., Budapest, 2020.; Roland Kelemen – Richárd Németh: A kibertér alanyai és sebezhetősége. [Cyberspace entities and vulnerability.] In: Szakmai Szemle, 2019/3. 95-118.; Roland Kelemen: A nem állami kibertéri műveletek egyes szereplőinek jelentősége a hibrid konfliktusokban [The importance of certain actors of non-state cyberspace operations in hybrid conflicts.] In: SmartLaw Research Group Working Paper 2021/2.

<sup>4</sup> In this respect, see: Abishur Prakash: Go.AI: A mesterséges intelligencia geopolitikája. [Go.AI: The geopolitics behind artificial intelligence.] Pallas Athéné Books, Budapest, 2020.; Abishur Prakash: Új geopolitika. A világ jövője. [New geopolitics. The future of the world.] Pallas Athéné Books, Budapest, 2018.; Yuval Noah Harari: Homo Deus. A holnap rövid története. [Homo Deus. A brief history of tomorrow.] Animus Kiadó, Budapest, 2017.; Yuval Noah Harari: 21. lecke a 21. Századra. [Lesson 21 for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.] Animus Kiadó, Budapest, 2018.; Markku Wilenius: A jövő nyomában. A globális változások érkező hullámának megértése. [Tracing the future. Understanding the approaching wave of global changes.] Pallas Athéné Books, Budapest, 2019.

<sup>5</sup> In this respect, see: Péter Szigeti: Vázlat a közbiztonság három dimenziójáról: világrendszer – nemzetállami szint és lokalitás. [A sketch of the three dimensions of public security: global system - nation state level and

In terms of *the depth and the scope* of the process, public discourse and some analyses have underscored the issue of special legal order and the fate of the effective regulatory framework as well as the potential political risks of the 2023 effective date,<sup>6</sup> disregarding that the scope of the regulation affected by the amendment is much broader. In the context of A9FL, it is noteworthy that the reduction of the number of categories in the system applicable to special legal order through the removal three specific circumstances (state of preventive defence, state of terrorist threat and unexpected attack) essentially broadens the defence and security remit of normal legal order. By eliminating these circumstances from the scope of special legal order due to their nature, the legislator simultaneously lifts the restriction that these duties can only be performed in a state of special legal order in compliance with the rules specified for that state, such as by applying military power. Nevertheless, given the experiences arising from the security environment, this creates a completely new situation for regulations in a state of normal legal order, as the basic approach Hungary has applied since the change of the political system only authorised public entities of military character<sup>7</sup>, particularly the Hungarian Defence Forces to engage as organisations in cooperative and armed action in domestic territory for longer periods during states of special legal order. As demonstrated by the pressure of migration, the crisis in the South Slavic region followed by that in the Ukraine and the wave of terrorism in Europe, the security environment has clearly rendered this approach outdated, yet one should point out that the framework of operations by the relevant bodies in a state of normal legal order, ranging from the deployment of forces, through the application of measures and coercive tools to standby systems, were meant to make a sharp distinction between operations in a state of normal legal order and operations that interpret armed engagement as duty under special legal order.

In the context of the foregoing, it should also be underlined that the complexity of the security environment juxtaposes the new framework of operating in a state of normal legal order with multiple forms of threats and time buckets. In terms of the depth and the scope of the legislation, it is therefore not only a question of whether coordinated defence action which is defined in the Coordination Act as a form of crisis management in normal legal order will in time replace or be ranked higher than most of the sectoral instances of crisis, apart from the most specific ones such as health and defence? One must also elaborate an adequate and fully blown answer to the question about the nature of the framework for addressing challenges that cannot qualify immediately for crisis management under the normal legal order, as the latter will provide a variety of authorisations for action alongside enhanced coordination of the executive arm of government and a more centralised governance framework to deal with protracted threats in line with the principles of necessity and proportionality. In this context, the European experience forecasts the need to find solutions especially for major terrorist acts and potentially unexpected attacks, by ensuring that the bodies with ultimate responsibility take necessary and proportionate action and partner bodies are immediately involved without declaring a crisis situation in a state of normal legal order. All the more so because the latter

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locality.] In: Péter Szigeti (Ed.): *A valóság vonzásában.* [Attracted by reality.] Széchenyi István Főiskola, Győr, 2001, pp. 283–306.

<sup>6</sup> See: Szabolcs Till: *A honvédelmi alkotmányosság tematikus trendjei és hangsúlyváltozásai I.* [Thematic trends and changes in focus in the constitution of national defence, I.] In: *Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle* 2021/1. pp. 42-7.; István Hofman – Pál Kádár: *A különleges jogrend és a válságkezelés közigazgatási jogi kihívásai I.* [The challenges of special legal order and crisis management for legislation on public administration, I.] In: *Védelmi-Biztonsági Szabályozási és Kormányzástani Műhelytanulmányok* 2021/2.

<sup>7</sup> In my previous research, I defined entities of military as bodies authorised by law to give effect to the state's monopoly to apply force legitimately, while functioning, as the overarching rule says, in a hierarchy of military order, a command system of orders and to perform operations of armed character generally associated with the entity as a whole.

solution would only amount to 'relabelling' under public law in addition to the possible loss of administrative time, instead of enforcing the rules applicable in a state of special legal order. However, it is also important to be prepared in this respect for situations where, for example, armed/violent actions combined with information operations have an unexpectedly intense impact and therefore require public authorities to take immediate action, for instance in the context of law enforcement, the military, national security, energy management and communications.

Finally, a question arises with regard to depth and scope about the kind of amendments one can or should expect in sectoral regulations over and above those needed to ensure harmony with the A9FL and the Coordination Act, given the technical and security changes that justified the drafting of AT9M and the Coordination Act, as the scope of such regulations covers almost all of the sectors with vital infrastructure due to the complexity of security. This question arises because A9FL aims to provide a public law framework, while the Coordination Act seeks to ensure cross-sectoral synergies and to escalate duties that a single sector cannot address effectively to combined level of governance. Nevertheless, as emphasised in Article 3(1) of the Coordination Act, the national defence, law enforcement and national security services continue to act as pillars of the country's defence and security system, and civil society, including the public and civil administration as a whole, characterized by the ability and willingness to cooperate, provides a solid basis for the effective operation of those pillars. As a result, however, the A9FL and the Coordination Act do not offer solutions for the technical and operational upgrading needed in the various sectors, and at most formulate the legislator's guidance in that respect; after all sectoral regulations should, at the level of implementation, also reflect the changes taken into account while drafting the A9FL and the Coordination Act and should couple with the professional generation of technical needs and coordination performed centrally as part of the reform.

The previous paragraph lends particular importance to the issue of *organising the involvement of professional, scientific and social discourse*. In addition to its importance for the rule of law, this element also has extraordinary consequences in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of a reform process which, as already noted, involves a large number of sectoral regulations, given the complexity of security, and which, in a changing environment, should also coincide with epoch-making changes in the traditional security and defence functions. In this respect, the rapid pace of technological development and the diversity and importance of the various disciplines in this arena, which are classified as civilian from a defence and security perspective, inevitably require a background of intellectual support for the reform process. That support should be fuelled by the scientific and technical needs and perspectives of all the fields involved, but the defence and security profession should refrain from specifying details other than a few major security objectives, and instead should coordinate the possible and viable regulation and practical application of the challenges identified by the various professional and scientific disciplines.

This issue is also crucial from another point of view, since the changes triggered by A9FL will, on the one hand, also introduce a new situation in terms of a possible application from a public perspective, the understanding of which could be greatly enhanced by the proper and two-way communication of the changes despite the difficulties arising from the shortcomings of political culture. Even more important, however, is the approach of the Coordination Act, which aims to establish in Hungary a fully blown and complex system of national resilience and is the first to specify it by the name defined by NATO, and to complement it with the development of security awareness and security perception. This is because these goals are impossible to achieve without the understanding and support of the public, and can at most be applied in specific situations on the basis of the fleeting emotions aroused by events, which, however, reduces the resilience of the public, since unconditional

public support will only become unquestionably attainable at higher levels of escalation if the public fails to understand and take on board this new approach to defence institutions.

The proper establishment and regular operation of the National Defence and Security Forum as envisaged in Article 43(1) of the Act, along with the communication of its discourse, also including its debates, may serve as a suitable breakout point alleviating this problem. Yet doing so is only a necessary but insufficient condition. This is because of the traditional absence of significant and high quality discourse in Hungary about the proper approach to the complexity of security issues and the division of defence and security duties and responsibilities between the state and the public. Mention must also be made of the failure of professional and scientific organisations to truly adopt the synergistic approach reflected by the Coordination Act on the basis of A9FL and foreign models, including but not limited to NATO resilience requirements, because sectoral separation continues to dominate and the bondage between professional-scientific workshops and professional organisations continues to prevail either through the legal status of some/most of their members or through the nature of their organisation.

There is, however, another element of social context which requires particular attention when one sets out to carry out a genuine reform that has long-term impacts and also prepares the ground for periodic fine-tuning. This element is the strengthening of the security awareness and the security perception of future generations. On the one hand, this is a question of upbringing and education, as there is no other way to ensure a positive shift that encompasses the public as a whole almost evenly. On the other hand, however, this set of questions is linked to professional and scientific skills and discourse, as set out above, since it is only against such a background that upbringing and education can integrate credible, professionally sound and globally responsive knowledge in a manner to drive the members of future generations to adopt conscious and responsible behaviours that match the security environment instead of responding out of fear or prejudice. The defence and security apparatus of the state may take a supporting role in this area and may also set requirements to a certain extent. Nevertheless it is necessary to develop a framework underpinned by professional, scientific and educational synergies to ensure the robustness of strengthening public security awareness, so that it can be modern, adaptable to change and yet credible and balanced, as the development of a proper security awareness programme alone involves a complex and significant set of tasks, which should be clearly differentiated from the day-to-day tasks of the defence and security apparatus for the sake of keeping things well-balanced. However, the generation to come will be an instrumental factor in terms of the public component, including security and security awareness at the level of the public.

A third set of questions is crucial from the perspective of creating the broadest possible professional, scientific and social discourse and putting it to effective and constructive use: *clarifying the direction set for systemic renewal, i.e. genuine reform, or mostly for operational research*. Péter Szigeti identified the problem in relation to law enforcement already in the early 2000s, pointing out that Hungarian practice would typically resort to fine tuning within the existing framework on the basis of daily experiences and operating through organisational revamping. However, he also underlined that these solutions are not good or bad unless the environment changes to an extent that it prevents the efficient use of existing frameworks for managing the issues as they arise.<sup>8</sup> We agree with the diagnosis and think it is important to stress that it is still valid today, albeit not only for law

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Péter Szigeti, Ibid. (2001); Ádám Farkas: A több síkú megközelítés jelentősége a védelem és biztonság szabályozásának és szervezésének komplex kutatásaiban, különös tekintettel az Eurázsia-gondolatra. [The importance of a multi-level approach in complex research projects focussing on the regulation and organization of defence and security, with particular focus on the notion of Eurasia.] In: Védelmi-Biztonsági Szabályozási és Kormányzástani Műhelytanulmányok 2021/9.

enforcement but for the entire system of defence and security regulations and institutions of the government and the public of Hungary.<sup>9</sup>

In our view, the defence and security reform can be effectively implemented if, in the process of its elaboration, a balance is struck (in respect of both combined governance and single sector levels) between a social science approach and methodology and the perspective of fine tuning and operational research, which is based on daily practices, given that the former also involves a mindset of examining and constructively criticising concepts and systemic levels. In this respect, however, it should also be pointed out that a systemic approach relies mostly on scientific attitudes, approaches and experience, or in other words, it cannot be replaced by practice or by delegating specific tasks. It is a unique approach that necessarily draws on empirical knowledge of reality through the specific features of social scientific analysis<sup>10</sup>, but at the same time analyses and evaluates targeted phenomena in a number of other contexts and from a much wider perspective. From this perspective, therefore, this approach may be seen as some kind of capacity, needed both during epoch-making reforms and periodic fine tuning, if the investment of time and energy needed for effective action and essential capacities are taken into account. All the more so because neglecting this kind of capacity while epoch-making changes (such those introduced by the political changes of 1989 in the area of defence and security among various pressures according to our latest position) are in progress would marginalise the practitioners of the discipline in question, and would reduce their informational embeddedness along with the validity of their findings and methods, or would force them to move along alternative tracks. And such a deficit of skills cannot be compensated for overnight, even if candidates are simultaneously offered significant existential benefits. The question is therefore twofold: shall we maintain the approach that preserves the predominance of operations research in the process opened up by A9FL and the Coordination Act, and if not, what are the plans for reintroducing a systemic approach, which is a competence in short supply in Hungary's defence and security system?

### **3. The historical potential of the defence and security reform**

The questions raised above follow naturally from the fact of change. In my view, the issues of change can be seen as a series of tasks and challenges, rather than as obstacles. It is much more useful to interpret the countless identified and yet unidentified change-related issues as opportunities. We would like to highlight some of these below.

In terms of opportunities, we will emphasize the social, technical and scientific aspects of the questions identified, because these could have significant long-term benefits not only for the defence and security reform per se, but also for the complete relationship between the state and the public and for most sectors of security.

As regards the field of strengthening the security awareness and perception of the public, the proper organisation and operation of the National Defence and Security Forum

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Ádám Farkas: Az állam fegyveres védelmének alapvonalai és Kiegészést követő polgári evolúciója. [Baselines for the armed defence of a state and its civilian development after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise.] Széchenyi István University, PhD dissertation, Győr, 2018.

<sup>10</sup> See: Max Weber: A szociológiai és közgazdasági tudományok „értékmentességének” értelme. [The meaning of 'valuelessness' in sociological and economic studies.] In: Max Weber: Tanulmányok. [Studies.] Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998, pp. 70-126.; Max Weber: A társadalomtudományos és társadalompolitikai megismerés „objektivitása”. [The 'objectivity' of cognition in social science and social policy.] In: Max Weber: Tanulmányok. [Studies.] Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 1998, pp. 7-69.; Péter Szigeti: A kritikai társadalomtudományi megismerés specifikumai. [The specifics of cognition in critical social science.] In: Jog Állam Politika 2013/1. pp. 39-70.

should receive emphasis because in addition to providing an opportunity for consulting and exchanging views as envisaged in the Coordination Act, because doing so would on the one hand allow the public to be informed about changes in the security environment and the activities of the organisations involved, which would in turn provide feedback to the bodies concerned in terms of public support and understanding. Such a two-way discourse could also open up new opportunities for the replenishment of human resources and could turn the Forum into a meeting point where future cooperation projects and linkages between state and non-state actors can unfold.

However, one can assume, based on the wording of the Coordination Act, that the National Defence and Security Forum will be organised from time to time as cyclically recurring significant event. If this assumption is correct, a new opportunity emerges terms of the professional and scientific background for establishing defence and security think-tanks geared to complex security issues with the duty to analyse, evaluate and develop proposals, and for creating incentives for conducting research that genuinely and innovatively contributes to security assurance at combined governance level and to strengthening national resilience. The development of an applications system, in cooperation, where appropriate, with the budgetary research centres involved as sponsors in defence and security functions, could be an appropriate instrument in both of these areas. Indeed, encouraging the strengthening of research portfolios that can also support the development of the effectiveness of combined governance as well as sectoral specifics is a long-term investment, especially where the portfolios represent a multidisciplinary approach. In this context, it is important to make funding available also for entities without direct public policy linkages or determinations as well as for existing/emerging research groups<sup>11</sup> affiliated to the state. In this context, one should recognized that supporting research in the areas of natural and applied sciences in the context of the targeted development of the defence industry should couple with encouraging research into defence and security issues in social sciences and humanities, as these disciplines should also be involved due to the proliferation of hybrid challenges and the appreciation of the human factor in cyber space.

With regard to professional/scientific issues, a reform opportunity to be evaluated separately arises since entering into a systemic discourse based on a scientific approach will help revise various solidified dogmatic views or internationally outdated positions, while formulating the need for and setting the direction of change in a constructive debate will not and could not couple with accusations for the failure to change. I believe this opportunity is of paramount importance in Hungary for law enforcement, national defence and the national security services, as these sectors and functions are still heavily burdened by a legacy of past prejudices and misconceptions fuelled by the shortage of information, and motivated fear, incitement and, more recently, the desire to increase the number of Internet views. However, this opportunity is not limited to and is not even primarily about clarifying various issues, instead it offers the chance to reduce the decade-long confidence deficit fuelled by false assumptions and views, or positions that have become obsolete in the meantime, and, ultimately, to strengthen the cooperation between the state and the public.

As regards opportunities, I believe on should also recognise that cyber space and the abundance of information, both of which are key to the complex security of the 21st century, could reopen the discussions about communication in the context of the defence and security functions of the state. It carries the potential to establish balanced, credible and professionally validated communication solutions and platforms in Hungary about defence and security issues, which can be of interest to the state through strengthening public confidence and undermining the success of potential disinformation in advance and to the public through

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<sup>11</sup> This includes, in particular, various research bodies of the National University of Public Service and various budgetary research sites.



warranting access to proper sources of information. Naturally, this cannot happen without depoliticising the issue of defence and security as far as possible. In other words, the premise that Hungary's defence and security is a national matter, and that national defence and disaster management are also national matters needs to be enriched with content suggesting that professional issues may not be subject to daily political debate, which should only address questions that need to be given publicity and attention amid political competition in a plural democracy for the sake of control.

Lastly, reviewing the place and role of defence and security related topics in education should also be considered. On the one hand, it would not be possible to adequately strengthen the security awareness of future generations through education and training channels without doing so, and on the other hand, a review in the context of a reform process and the identification of new needs and directions on that basis can be achieved without negative value judgements. In this context, it should also be borne in mind that addressing security and defence issues, particularly in higher education once again and in a novel way, could also create extra benefits associated with the added value created through the periodic involvement of civil society professionals of various fields of study in discussing security issues. However, in order to exploit this potential following the review, it is first necessary to identify a sound and reasonable body of knowledge that education and training systems can embrace along with the modern methods that promote the acquisition of such knowledge without creating excessive burden, fear, anger or prejudice.

#### **4. Conclusion**

The reform opportunity that the adoption of A9FL and the Coordination Act opened in the field of defence and security in Hungary is of historical importance. It should, however, be managed appropriately in every respect.

On the one hand, one needs to stress time and again that regulation is not an end in itself and not for its own sake only. It creates a framework within the rule of law for developing and applying capabilities appropriately, and by doing so ultimately provides direct support for social and economic functioning and development, as well for asserting the rights of the individual and for security. Consequently, truly modern regulation must also rely on a synthesis of the countless alternative perspectives and systemic relationships that exist in reality, analysing and, where necessary, adapting international models with a view to domestic characteristics, as well as both the past and present experiences and the challenges of the foreseeable future.

On the other hand, regardless of the degree of specificity of the regulated target area - such as in the case of defence and security legislation - the rules can only be sufficiently effective and embedded if, after the initial steps and decisions, a broad professional and scientific discourse, constructiveness and appropriate social linkage help them unfold. This is especially so in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, since the information age has brought with it the capacity to quickly turn any phenomenon into a social issue and even a source of tension. This impact can be kept within proper boundaries if the public has basic knowledge about and a vantage point of the issue at hand (in our case, the renewal of the defence and security system) regarding credible sources of information and professional and scientific opinions, which will help its orientation and will also generate trust and hence lead to legitimacy.

It is in this spirit that this paper has sought to identify some of the questions in the context of the defence and security reform that has begun but is likely to take years if not decades to complete. Answering these questions and exploiting the identified opportunities

will be conducive to an effective reform with truly 21<sup>st</sup> century character and eventually the advent of a new era.

Deep as they are, the questions raised and the opportunities identified may be classified as critical, and one might say that answering and exploiting them will be one of the hurdles of the reform process, since in recent decades the defence and security issues have been far removed from public discourse, and even from the deeper professional and scientific discourse in many disciplines. That means practising this genre needs to be learned even if while the level of development of Hungarian political culture seems to be unfavourable for this learning process.

However, I believe that in an age where security couples with unprecedented complexity, where the intricacy and dynamics of threats keep intensifying, where changes in technology coupled with those of society, the economy and security are increasingly intensive, and where renewing our security consciousness and our defence and security mindset will not work unless we connect various knowledge bases and involve and strengthen the public, we must first of all agree to identify critical issues in order to identify possible directions for solutions without getting entangled in questions about responsibility. For without asking the right questions and following through the constructive discussions they generate, only “the surface is chattering, the deep is silent.”<sup>12</sup>

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